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I. INTRODUCTION
Exercise caution in your business affairs, for the world is full of
trickery.  But let this not blind you to what virtue there is; many
persons strive for high ideals, and everywhere
life is full of heroism.1
-Max Ehrmann
In the summer of 2004, Mario Leyva Jr. was faced with a difficult situa-
tion; he was already working two jobs in San Antonio, Texas: a work-
study job and a part-time job at his father’s landscaping business.2  Due to
the drought that summer, Mr. Leyva’s father’s business was slow, mean-
ing money was tight for Mr. Leyva and his family because he was the only
one in the family able to work.3
During this summer, Mr. Leyva lived with his father and sister, as well
as his mother who was disabled—a transplant patient requiring constant
1. MAX EHRMANN, Desiderata (1927), reprinted in THE DESIDERATA OF HAPPINESS:
A COLLECTION OF PHILOSOPHICAL POEMS 10 (1995).
2. Interview with Mario Leyva Jr., in San Antonio, Tex. (Nov. 3, 2010) (on file with
The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues).  The landscaping business con-
sisted of mowing services. Id.
3. Id.
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care.4  To him, the only solution for getting the additional money needed
to pay the family’s monthly expenses—mortgage payments, groceries,
utilities—was to get a loan.5  But neither he nor his father, who had bad
credit, could secure a loan from a traditional lender.6  Mr. Leyva felt that
the only option left was to get a payday loan.7
Accordingly, he went to a payday lender and requested $500, but the
payday lender only approved him for $225 due to Mr. Leyva’s credit rat-
ing.8  Mr. Leyva accepted this amount, even though it was not enough to
completely meet his financial needs.9  The payday lender gave him a max-
imum of two months to repay the loan, with a warning that after that
period, the fees would increase.10  When Mr. Leyva asked what would
happen if he went over the two-month period, the payday lender said that
“grace extensions” might be possible.11
Unfortunately, Mr. Leyva could not meet the two-month deadline, but
the payday lender offered to readjust the terms of the original loan, al-
lowing a six-month period to pay the loan back.12  During the initial two-
month period, he could only afford to pay the interest and nothing to-
wards the principal, thus the balance did not go down.13  As a result of
the readjustment, the interest rate went up by two to three points, which
in turn made the original $225 required repayment amount increase to
nearly $400.14
After the payday lender readjusted the interest rate, Mr. Leyva’s situa-
tion became dire.15  Not able to find an alternative lender, he began to
fall behind on his mortgage payments and other bills.16  In order to meet
his expenses, he was forced to sell personal property.17  Thankfully, seven
months after the loan origination Mr. Leyva was finally able to gather
enough money to pay off the payday loan.18  After factoring the accrued
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Interview, supra note 2.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Interview, supra note 2.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Interview, supra note 2.
18. Id.  He was only able to do so because the landscaping business began to acquire
more work and therefore his income increased. Id.
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interest, Mr. Leyva paid the lender a total of $800 on the initial $225 loan,
effectively paying an interest rate of over 250%.19
It does not take a large stretch of the imagination to imagine individu-
als in situations like Mr. Leyva.  Nearly everyone at one time or another
has needed money when there was simply not enough.  The reasons may
range from pleasure to absolute necessity, e.g., having to pay bills, or pro-
viding food for a family.  Unfortunately, those who are economically dis-
advantaged are more likely to have to resort to getting a payday loan, as
they may not be able to get a loan from a more traditional source such as
a bank, or perhaps they live in an area without reputable banks—this is
especially true in San Antonio, Texas.20
Due to a lack of access to more traditional banking loans, some individ-
uals resort to payday lenders to meet their financial needs.  Payday loans
are usually for a short period of time, for a small amount of money, have
an exorbitant interest rate, and often include various fees that all too
often force the borrower to refinance the loan, slipping into a downward
spiral of debt.21  Furthermore, while there has been some success in en-
acting statutes in Texas to protect borrowers, there are still loopholes by
which payday lenders can charge enormous interest rates and fees.22
This Comment focuses on the nature of payday loans in Texas, includ-
ing what a payday loan is, its cost to borrowers, and a brief discussion of
how the payday loan industry is thriving.  Part III discusses the problems
borrowers typically experience in obtaining these loans, which include: a
19. Id.  This was the interest rate for the seven-month period, which when viewed as
an annual rate is around 428%. Id.  Upon reflecting on the whole experience of receiving a
payday loan, Mr. Leyva regretted his decision, and was specifically upset about how
quickly the payday lender was able to change the terms of the loan. Id.
20. See William Pack, Bank Branches: Following the Money, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEWS, Dec. 17, 2006, at 1K (indicating that individuals living in East Side communities and
the West Side of the inner-city have fewer options for banking at larger, more established
branches).  According to this article, San Antonio’s “inner-city areas are less likely to see
new [bank] branches than the more affluent areas to the north and west.” Id.
21. BANKING LAW: PREDATORY LENDING: RECENT INITIATIVES TO DEFINE AND
ELIMINATE LENDING ABUSE § 5[1], at SP-50 (Mia T. Smith & Marjorie Grodd Brown eds.,
2001) [herinafter BANKING LAW] (characterizing payday loans).  It is possible for borrow-
ers to have more than one payday loan at a time. Id. at SP-51.
22. See Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Sleight of
Hand: Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1152
(2008) (footnote omitted) (mentioning that “credit service organizations” may charge addi-
tional fees for setting up the loan between the borrower and the lender, allowing payday
lenders to remain in compliance with state law while ignoring price limits).  In such ar-
rangements, “the underlying loan itself generally complies with state law, but the compa-
nies also assess a brokering fee that generates a price that is far in excess of the usury
limit.” Id.  For details regarding Texas usury laws, see Title 4 of the Texas Finance Code,
available at http://www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us/Docs/FI/htm/FI.303.htm.
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lack of alternative loans that forces individuals to get payday loans, a dis-
parate bargaining power between the borrower and lender, and the usuri-
ous nature of the loans themselves.  In order to understand these
problems, a review of the relevant Texas usury laws as well as Texas stat-
utes and the scope of their coverage as they relate to payday loans will be
examined.  Furthermore, the most favored lender doctrine as well as the
exportation doctrine will be discussed, as these two doctrines permit pay-
day lenders to avoid Texas law.  Then, the unique relationship between
payday lenders and federally regulated, state-chartered banks will be ana-
lyzed, as the nature of this relationship raises several concerns.
After the problems with payday loans are identified and the relevant
statutes and case law are discussed, this Comment will then shift focus to
possible reform.  This will include suggestions for change such as prohib-
iting lenders from being able to target the economically disadvantaged,
and legislation that not only would end the harm being done, but also
impose severe penalties on lenders who take advantage of borrowers.  In
addition, a number of solutions will be proposed, which include (1) hav-
ing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) properly regulate
the state-chartered banks they insure, (2) creating new Texas law that,
instead of attacking the usurious interest rates, seeks to eliminate the
practice of payday lending in Texas, and (3) providing borrowers with low
credit an alternative to payday loans that does not trap them in a cycle of
debt.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. What is a Payday Loan?
Before any discussion about the relevant laws and problems associated
with payday loans, the very nature of payday loans must be examined and
understood.  These loans are generally “small, short-term loans that are
intended to bridge the borrower’s cash-flow gap between paydays.”23
The average amount borrowed ranges from $100 to $500, generally with a
two-week period given to repay the loan.24  In addition, payday loans are
often characterized by “extremely high interest rates and fees, and are
23. Shane M. Mendenhall, Payday Loans: The Effects of Predatory Lending on Soci-
ety and the Need for More State and Federal Regulation, 32 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 299, 301
(2007).  Another characteristic of payday loans is that they are “unsecured loans with an
enormously high interest rate.” Id.
24. Peterson, supra note 22, at 1123–24.  Even though “there is no agreed upon source
of information for payday loans, the Center for Responsible Lending estimates a typical
charge of $52 for a $325 loan.” Id. at 1123.
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refinanced frequently.”25  They may also be known as “payday advances,
deferred deposit loans, cash advance loans, check advance loans, post-
dated check loans, or delayed deposit check loans.”26
As illustrated by Mr. Leyva’s story, a two-week payback period is often
unreasonable; Mr. Leyva spent approximately seven months paying off
his loan.27  What typically begins as one loan often turns into a series of
additional loans; basically, “a high-risk debtor [who previously obtained a
$325 payday loan] lacking $325 of liquid assets on any given day is rea-
sonably unlikely to have $377 two weeks later.”28  Obviously, the desper-
ate circumstances that drive individuals to obtain a payday loan in the
first place means that they will likely struggle with paying back both the
loan and the associated fees.  The cycle of debt that payday loan borrow-
ers may become trapped in is due to the effect of “rolling over” loans;
basically, the lender offers another loan, where “the lender typically rolls
over the loan into an additional loan, with additional fees.”29  This may
occur more than once for each borrower—on average, borrowers engage
in ten to twelve transactions with a payday lender each year.30  In es-
25. BANKING LAW, supra note 21.  In order to get a payday loan, a borrower usually
provides a post-dated check to be cashed in the future. Id.
26. Mendenhall, supra note 23.  Although payday lending may not be a new concept,
it did see a reemergence in Tennessee in the early 1990s and then spread nationwide. Id.
27. See Interview, supra note 2 (indicating that Mr. Leyva took more than two weeks
to repay the payday loan he received).
28. Peterson, supra note 22, at 1124. Numerous authorities agree that “payday bor-
rowers tend to fall into recurring debt patterns.” Id. at 1126.  With the high prices and a
lack of an accurate assessment of a borrower’s ability to repay the payday loan, the dura-
tion of a payday loan is likely to be more than a few weeks. Id. at 1124–26.  It may be
“economically more accurate to think of payday loans as medium-term debts with modest
prepayment rates.” Id.
29. BANKING LAW, supra note 21.  The frequent refinancing of the loans places a bor-
rower in a situation where “little or none of the payment has been applied to the loan
principal,” and this in turn leads to the borrower “owing much more money than they
originally borrowed due to the rapid buildup of finance charges.” Id.  On top of every-
thing, a borrower may be subjected to illegal collection practices by the lender, creating
even more pressure on the borrower. Id.
30. Karen E. Francis, Rollover, Rollover: A Behavioral Law and Economics Analysis
of the Payday-Loan Industry, 88 TEX. L. REV. 611, 617 (2010).  There is very little data
available as to how borrowers use payday loans. Id.  However, at least one study identified
the reasons payday borrowers used the payday loans; according to the Georgetown study,
“65.7% reported that their most recent advance was obtained because of emergencies.”
Id. at 618 (citing GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN & EDWARD C. LAWRENCE, CREDIT RESEARCH
CTR., MONOGRAPH NO. 35, PAYDAY ADVANCE CREDIT IN AMERICA: AN ANALYSIS OF
CUSTOMER DEMAND 47, available at http://faculty.msb.edu/prog/CRC/pdf/mono35.pdf,
which characterized emergencies as either being an unplanned expense or a temporary
income reduction.  Of the total new advances analyzed 47.2% were based on the former
definition).  This means that at least one-third of payday borrowers may not be using pay-
day loans for emergencies, resulting in a class of borrowers who might be “making a mis-
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sence, payday lenders are profiting from a borrower’s inability to pay,
both at the onset of the loan and later on because of further debt.
The cycle of debt is a problem that persists for borrowers, and payday
lenders continue to exploit borrowers’ weakened financial situations in
light of the current economic climate.  Within the last decade there was
significant growth in the number of payday lenders; for example, between
2000 and 2004, payday lenders “more than doubled from 10,000 to
22,000.”31  The availability of payday lenders will continue to grow, and
by 2011 the number of payday lenders is expected to exceed 40,000.32
Such rapid growth flows from the great profits available from often pow-
erless borrowers; at least one study indicates that “approximately [ninety
percent] of payday lending revenues are based on fees stripped from
trapped borrowers.”33  Furthermore, “[i]ndustry observers estimate
that . . . most payday lenders earn a return on assets between ten and
twenty times greater than traditional banks.”34  Payday lending is simply
an alternative to traditional loans that creates problems for those who
obtain them.  Payday lending stores are found predominantly “in poor
and minority neighborhoods” as well as “around military bases with large
populations of enlisted personnel.”35
It should come as no surprise that such prevalent access to payday
loans, combined with a thriving payday lending business, affects borrow-
ers in a negative way.  With an understanding of payday loans and their
impact on borrowers, a discussion of the relevant agencies and laws that
govern them is necessary to further realize how large a problem the loans
really are, especially in Texas.
take in obtaining these payday loans and could be [ ]biased in such a way that keeps them
from making this mistake.” Id. at 618.
31. Peterson, supra note 22, at 1127.
32. Id.  The number of payday lenders in Texas has tripled since 2007.  Enrique Ran-
gel, Rangel: Payday Lenders Still Unregulated, AMARILLO GLOBE-NEWS, May 29, 2011,
http://amarillo.com/opinion/opinion-columnist/2011-05-29/rangel-payday-lenders-still-un-
regulated.  Recent reports put the number of payday lender locations in Texas somewhere
above 3500. Id.
33. Peterson, supra note 22, at 1127.
34. Id. Even when a borrower only procures a small number of extensions on the
loan, “a borrower can find that she has repaid more than the original balance but still
[owe] the same principal,” and “the average payday loan borrower repays $793 for a $325
loan.” Id.
35. Id. at 1126.  In response to the increased number of payday lenders that gathered
around military bases, in 2006 “Congress adopted a [thirty-six percent] interest-rate cap on
loans to all military personnel and their dependents.” Id. at 1128; John Warner Nat’l De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. 109-364, sec. 987, § 670(a), 120 Stat.
2083, 2266 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 987(b)).
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B. Relevant Authorities That Govern Payday Lenders in Texas
i. Texas Office of Consumer Credit Commissioner
Under the Texas Finance Code, the Office of Consumer Credit Com-
missioner (OCCC) is authorized to oversee payday loans in Texas.36  The
OCCC is tasked with enforcing Subtitles B and C under Title 4 of the
Texas Finance Code, which regulates loans and financed transactions, and
pawnshops respectively.37  In addition, payday loans are subject to Sub-
chapter F of the Texas Finance Code, which covers alternate charges for
certain loans, and are also supervised by the OCCC.38  The OCCC re-
quires payday lenders that operate in Texas to be licensed,39 but due to
the exportation of out-of-state interest rates (a concept that will be dis-
cussed in Part III.B below) the OCCC does not have control over this
practice by payday lenders.40
ii. Finance Commission of Texas
The Finance Commission of Texas (FCT), comprised of appointees by
the Governor of Texas, is the oversight body of the OCCC.41  Duties of
the FCT include adopting appropriate banking rules under the Texas Fi-
nance Code42 that “preserve or protect the safety and soundness of state
36. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 14.101 (West 2006).  Specifically, it is the commissioner of
the OCCC who “shall enforce this chapter, Subtitles B and C of Title 4, and Chapter 394 in
person or through an assistant commissioner, examiner, or other employee of the office.”
Id.
37. Id.
38. SUBCOMM. ON CONSUMER CREDIT LAWS, S. COMM. ON ECON. DEV., INTERIM
REP. TO THE 77TH TEX. LEG., at 12 (2000), available at http://www.senate.state.tx.us/75r/
senate/commit/archive/c510/pdf/Consumer/Consumer_credit_Laws_report.pdf.
39. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 342.051 (West 2006).  A license is necessary in order to:
(1) engage in the business of making, transacting, or negotiating loans subject to this
chapter; or (2) contract for, charge, or receive, directly or indirectly, in connection
with a loan subject to this chapter, a charge, including interest, compensation, consid-
eration, or another expense, authorized under this chapter that in the aggregate ex-
ceeds the charges authorized under other law.
Id.  Exceptions to the licensing requirement exist if a person is: “(1) a bank, savings bank,
or savings and loan association organized under the laws of the United States or under the
laws of the institution’s state of domicile; or (2) subject to Chapter 651, Insurance Code.”
Id.
40. Deena Reynolds, A Look at Payday Loans & Current Regulation in Texas, 8 TEX.
TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 321, 330–31 (2007).
41. Home, TX. FIN. COMM’N, www.fc.state.tx.us (last visited Sept. 28, 2011).  Specifi-
cally, the Finance Commission of Texas is “composed of nine members appointed by the
governor with the advice and consent of the senate.” TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 11.101 (West
2006).
42. See TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 11.301 (West 2006) (reading in pertinent part that
“[t]he finance commission may adopt banking rules as provided by Section 31.003”).
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banks” and “grant the same rights and privileges to state banks that are
or may be granted to national banks domiciled in this state.”43
iii. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
The Banking Act of 1933 created the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (FDIC).44  The FDIC is essentially a federal insurance company
that regulates state banks, which are not members of the Federal Reserve
System.45  The FDIC provides insurance to state banks, and under the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, the
FDIC has the authority to regulate the business conducted by these
banks.46  State banks that are regulated by the FDIC partner with payday
lenders,47 and it is this partnership that creates the loophole in which pay-
day lenders are able to avoid liability under Texas law.
43. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. §§ 31.003(a)(2)–(3) (West 2006).  The notion of fairness
between state and national banks is analogous to the most favored lender doctrine, infra
III.B.i.
44. Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933, 73 Pub. L. 66, Sec. 8, § 12B, 48 Stat. 162, 168
(codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 265–66); CARL FELSENFELD & DAVID L. GLASS, BANKING REGU-
LATION IN THE UNITED STATES 165 (3d ed. 2011).  In 1933, the federal Banking Act was
also known as the Glass-Steagall Act, but this name “has been used more recently to de-
scribe only those portions of the Act that deal with the securities activities of banks.” FEL-
SENFELD & GLASS, supra.  Insurance under the FDIC was a result of a New Deal program,
which helped protect banks financially by insuring deposits. Id. at 166.  Even though the
FDIC is the “primary federal regulator of the insured, nonmember state banks,” it does
not actually charter state banks—these banks are chartered and regulated “by their state
bank regulators.” Id.
45. Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act § 12B; see FELSENFELD & GLASS, supra note 44, at
13 (discussing the nature of FDIC regulation of nonmember state banks).  Banks that are
members of the Federal Reserve System, including national and state banks “are required
by law to have FDIC insurance.” FELSENFELD & GLASS, supra note 44, at 13.  Even
though it appears that state nonmember banks are not subject to that requirement, “[o]ver
[ninety-eight percent] of state banks, however, do have FDIC insurance.” Id. The FDIC
imposes affirmative regulations on banks whose deposits it guarantees to ensure that the
banks’ actions do not “unduly endanger the insurance fund.” Id.
46. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, 102 Pub. L.
No. 242, § 303, 105 Stat. 2236, 2349 (codified at 12 U.S.C.§ 1831(a) note); FELSENFELD &
GLASS, supra note 44, at 13.  The grant of authority over state banks to the FDIC requires
that “an insured state bank may not engage in any business not allowed to a national bank
unless the FDIC gives its approval under certain prescribed standards.” FELSENFELD &
GLASS, supra note 44, at 173
47. JEAN ANN FOX, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., UNSAFE AND UNSOUND: PAYDAY
LENDERS HIDE BEHIND FDIC BANK CHARTERS TO PEDDLE USURY 11 (2004), available at
http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/file/finance/pdlrentabankre-
port.pdf.  In essence, the payday lender does all of the work associated with making the
loan, with the state bank only allowing the payday lender to use its name and charter
status.  Reynolds, supra note 40, at 332.
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When an FDIC-regulated state bank partners with a payday lender, a
loophole allowing for the sidestepping of Texas law is created.  In Texas,
payday lenders appear to only partner with FDIC-regulated banks.48
Before one can understand how this arrangement enables payday lenders
to avoid Texas law, it is first helpful to understand what a state bank is.
A state bank is “any bank, banking association, trust company, savings
bank, industrial bank . . . which—(A) is engaged in the business of receiv-
ing deposits, other than trust funds . . . and (B) is incorporated under the
laws of any State.”49  However, the term that most closely resembles the
particular kind of state bank that payday lenders partner with is called a
state nonmember bank.  These are banks that are not members of the
Federal Reserve System (FRS).50  State nonmember banks are not con-
trolled by the FRS but instead are subject to their respective state’s regu-
latory agency, and in order to be insured by the FDIC they have to apply
for approval—upon such approval, they then fall under the supervision of
the FDIC.51  Because an FDIC-regulated bank is able to use the law and
interest rates from the state where it is located, instead of the state where
the payday lender is located, the problem of payday loans exists.52
In order to understand how this is possible, consider the following:
state A is where the FDIC-regulated state nonmember bank is, and state
B is where the payday lender conducts its business.  State A does not
have any regulation concerning payday lending or interest rate caps,
while state B offers some protection.  When the payday lender in state B
partners with the bank in state A, the nature of that relationship allows
the payday lender to use the governing law of state A in state B.
48. Reynolds, supra note 40, at 337.  Since the FDIC allows the exportation of usuri-
ous interest rates from its member banks to Texas, and “[ninety-six percent] of licensed
payday lenders in Texas [export] out-of-state interest rates,” the problem of this partner-
ship is apparent. Id. at 335.
49. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(a)(2) (2006).
50. § 1813(e)(2).  The FRS is essentially the central bank of the United States, and its
duties include overseeing the money supply and interest rates; this is accomplished by the
FRS deciding loan rates on short-term loans among banks. FELSENFELD & GLASS, supra
note 44, at 11.  Under the Federal Reserve System (FRS), all national banks are members,
but for state banks membership is a choice. Id. at 12.  A possible reason state banks are
not typically members of the FRS is due to the “comparatively little benefit and considera-
ble detriment that derives from membership.” Id.  If a state bank does become a member
of the FRS, that bank “accepts all the regulation imposed on a member bank and little in
the way of increased power,” which explains why so few state banks are members. Id.
51. 12 U.S.C. § 1815(a)(1) (2006).
52. Reynolds, supra note 40, at 334.  Payday lenders and state-chartered banks enter
into a “‘brokering’ relationship” whereby the payday lender “asserts it makes loans on the
bank’s behalf.” Id.
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This arrangement is allowed by the Depository Institutions Deregula-
tion and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDA).53  The purpose behind
allowing FDIC state banks to do this was to avoid any discrimination
against them by national banks, which in essence allows FDIC state
banks to have the “same ‘most favored lender’ status and right to export
interest enjoyed by national banks.”54  The FDIC concluded that DIDA
preempts the laws that exist in a borrower’s home state.55  As a result,
payday lenders may use interest rates that are found outside of Texas.
There may be a way to avoid preemption, and this is possible if the “over-
ride proposal . . . explicitly and by its terms indicate[s] that the state is
overriding the preemption.”56  Changing state law or amending the Texas
constitution to reflect the override proposal mentioned by the FDIC can
accomplish this,57 but it remains a lofty goal.
Not all states have similar regulations when it comes to interest rates
and payday loans, as there are three categories of regulation—(1) author-
ize payday loans but regulate them, (2) authorize payday loans but do not
regulate them, or (3) ban payday loans outright.58  Texas belongs to the
first category, and it is likely that payday lenders seek to export interest
rates into Texas from states of the second category, no regulation.59
53. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L.
96-221, Title V, § 521, 94 Stat. 132, 164 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a)).  This statute as
amended now reads:
In order to prevent discrimination against State-chartered insured depository institu-
tions, including insured savings banks, or insured branches of foreign banks with re-
spect to interest rates, if the applicable rate prescribed in this subsection exceeds the
rate such State bank or insured branch of a foreign bank would be permitted to charge
in the absence of this subsection, such State bank or such insured branch of a foreign
bank may, notwithstanding any State constitution or statute which is hereby pre-
empted for the purposes of this section, take, receive, reserve, and charge on any loan
or discount made, or upon any note, bill of exchange, or other evidence of debt, inter-
est at a rate of not more than [one] per centum in excess of the discount rate on
ninety-day commercial paper in effect at the Federal Reserve bank in the Federal
Reserve district where such State bank or such insured branch of a foreign bank is
located or at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, territory, or district where the
bank is located, whichever may be greater.
12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a)(2006).
54. FDIC Advisory Op., FDIC-93-27 (July 12, 1993), available at http://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/laws/rules/4000-8160.html#fdic400093-27.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.  Indeed, the legislative intent behind DIDA provides no reference to any in-
tent by Congress to “carve out state common law from the preemptive sweep of [S]ection
521.” Id.
58. Reynolds, supra note 40, at 337.
59. Id.  Within this category, states differ as to how they address payday lending, espe-
cially with regard to the rolling over of loans. Id. at 338.  This may include prohibiting or
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Texas could benefit from adopting the policies of a state like Georgia.60
Georgia made it a felony, via racketeering statutes, for payday lenders to
engage in charter renting as well as imposing possible civil liability on
payday lenders via class-action lawsuits.61
C. Filing a Claim Under Texas Usury Law
The laws in Texas that govern the interest rates charged by payday
lenders are known as usury laws, which are found in the Texas Finance
Code62 and in the Texas Constitution.63  Payday loans are brought within
the scope of the Texas Finance Code via § 83.604(b) of the Texas Admin-
limiting rollovers, and for “states that prohibit rollovers, some require a duty to inquire
upon the payday lender, while others do not.” Id.  As for limiting rollovers by providing
information to the borrower, this only consists of certain “requir[ed] written or verbal
warnings.” Id. See also ACE CASH EXPRESS, ACE PAYDAY ADVANCE (2008) (on file
with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law Review on Minority Issues) (this pamphlet, available to
patrons at each ACE location, contains several notices regarding the refinancing option for
borrowers who need more time to repay the loan).  Under the frequently asked questions
portion, the pamphlet gives borrowers the option of “[i]nstead of repaying the loan in full,
just bring in the fees and you can refinance up to [four] times.” Id.  If a borrower needs
more than four times to refinance the loan, ACE Cash Express allows the borrower to
apply for another loan. Id.
60. Georgia outlawed the exportation of usurious interest rates, which effectively min-
imized the harm that payday lenders inflict.  Reynolds, supra note 40, at 338.  The law
passed by Georgia was a “response to an increasing concern about its military personnel.”
Id.
61. Id.  In addition, this law specified certain practices by payday lenders regarding
military personnel that would no longer be allowed, including “banning the garnishment of
a soldier’s wages, collection practices against deployed personnel, and communication with
a soldier’s superior.” Id. at 339.
62. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. §§ 342.251–.259 (West 2006).  Subchapter F of the Texas
Finance Code covers: maximum cash advances, alternate interest charges, maximum inter-
est charges for loans with a single repayment, the disallowance of other charges, maximum
loan terms, refunds, default charges and deferment of payments, schedules for install-
ments, and loans with larger advances. Id.
63. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 11.  The text of this portion of the Texas constitution
reads as follows:
The Legislature shall have authority to classify loans and lenders, license and regulate
lenders, define interest and fix maximum rates of interest; provided, however, in the
absence of legislation fixing maximum rates of interest all contracts for a greater rate
of interest than ten percent (10%) per annum shall be deemed usurious; provided,
further, that in contracts where no rate of interest is agreed upon, the rate shall not
exceed six percent (6%) per annum.  Should any regulatory agency, acting under the
provisions of this Section, cancel or refuse to grant any permit under any law passed
by the Legislature; then such applicant or holder shall have the right of appeal to the
courts and granted a trial de novo as that term is used in appealing from the justice of
peace court to the county court.
Id.
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istrative Code.64  The two subtitles that make up the Texas Finance Code
are (A) “Interest,” covered by chapters 301 to 339, and (B) “Loans and
Financed Transactions,” covered by chapters 341 to 352.  Subtitle A fo-
cuses on typical commercial and consumer transactions.  This Comment
focuses on the material covered by Subtitle B, which governs usury ac-
tions for consumer loans, e.g., retail installment contracts, open-end ac-
counts, and payday loans.
The Texas Constitution generally prohibits interest rates that exceed
ten percent, unless there is legislation that sets a different cap on interest
rates—in that instance the legislation governs the cap instead of the Texas
Constitution.65  Payday lenders in Texas are prohibited from charging an
interest rate in excess of a maximum interest rate determined by the Of-
fice of Consumer Credit Commissioner (OCCC).  As of September 13,
2011, the maximum interest rate allowed by the OCCC for payday loans
is eighteen percent.66  Assuming that a payday lender imposes on a bor-
rower more than eighteen percent interest, a cause of action for usury
may lie.  This cause of action entails several elements: (1) the defendant
loans money to the plaintiff,67 (2) the plaintiff has an obligation to pay
back the loan,68 and (3) the defendant contracts for, charges, or receives
64. 7 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 83.604(b) (West 2011).  The relevant portion authorizing
payday loans reads as follows:
A licensee may engage in a payday loan or deferred presentment transaction under
this chapter and subject to the provisions of Texas Finance Code, Chapter 342, Sub-
chapter F.  A payday loan or deferred presentment transaction is a loan of money.
The check given in the transaction may serve as security for the payment of the loan.
A person who negotiates, arranges, or acts as an agent for an authorized lender in a
payday loan or deferred presentment transaction that has an effective annual rate of
greater than [ten percent] is required to be licensed.
Id.
65. Art. XVI, Section 11.  If the contract contains no agreed upon interest rate, the
cap is six percent. Id.
66. Office of Consumer Credit Comm’r, Notice of Rate Ceilings, 31 TEX. CREDIT LET-
TER 11 (2011), available at http://www.occc.state.tx.us/pages/publications/ccl/2011/0913.pdf.
The Office of Consumer Credit applies the eighteen percent cap to payday loans that are
“for personal, family, or household use.” Id.
67. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 301.002(a)(2)(B) (West 2006).  This statute defines “credit
card transaction” as “a transaction for personal, family, or household use in which a credit
card, plate, coupon book, or credit card cash advance check may be used or is used to debit
an open-end account in connection with . . . a loan of money.” Id.
68. Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 96 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).  In this case, “Anglo-Dutch did not have an absolute
obligation to repay the principal amounts that appellees invested,” and without the abso-
lute obligation, the usury claims failed as a matter of law. Id. at 96–97 (citing Rinyu v. Teal,
593 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).
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interest that exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law.69  The “ex-
ceeding of the maximum interest allowed” portion of the third element is
the crucial element that payday lenders sidestep and, thus, avoid
liability.70
i. Defedant Loans Money to the Plaintiff
In order for a usury action to lie, it must first be established that the
defendant loaned money to the plaintiff.  The classification of a defen-
dant depends upon which subtitle of the Texas Finance Code a plaintiff
brings suit under, either A or B.  If the plaintiff sues under Subtitle A, the
defendant has to be a creditor.71  For plaintiffs who have been aggrieved
by a payday lender, they are more likely to sue under Subtitle B, where
the defendant can be any person who contracts for, charges, or receives a
usurious amount; in addition, the defendant does not have to be a credi-
tor in order to be liable.72
The plaintiff, under either Subtitle A or B, has to be an obligor.73  An
obligor is defined as “a person to whom money is loaned to or credit is
69. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. §§ 305.001–.002, 349.001–.002 (West 2006).  Under these
sections, the penalties imposed depend on (1) if the person is “contracting for, charging, or
receiving” either interest or a time price differential, or (2) if the person made a charge
other than interest or a time price differential. Id.  The former situation will make the
person liable “for an amount equal to: (1) twice the amount of the interest or time price
differential contracted for, charged, or received; and (2) reasonable attorney’s fees set by
the court.” Id.  If the person is found to have made a charge other than interest or a time
price differential, that person will be liable:
[F]or an amount equal to: (1) the greater of: (A) three times the amount computed by
subtracting the amount of the charge authorized by this subtitle from the amount of
the charge contracted for, charged, or received; or (B) $2,000 or [twenty] percent of
the amount of the principal balance, whichever is less; and (2) reasonable attorney’s
fees set by the court.
Id.  Finally, if a person is found to have charged twice the amount that is authorized, under
§ 349.002, that person is also liable “for all principal or principal balance, as well as all
interest or time price differential.” Id. This liability includes all reasonable attorney’s fees.
Id.
70. Brendan Case, With Payday Loans, Poor Get the Loans, Firms Get the Payday,
DALL. MORNING NEWS, July 26, 2010, http://www.dallasnews.com/business/personal-fi-
nance/headlines/20100726-with-payday-loans-poor-get-the-loans-firms-get-the-payday.ece.
71. FIN. § 305.001.  A creditor is defined as “a person who loans money or otherwise
extends credit,” and “does not include a judgment creditor.” FIN. § 301.002(a)(3).  A judg-
ment creditor is “a person to whom a money judgment is payable.” Id. at § 301.002(a)(5).
72. See FIN. §§ 349.001–.002 (defining the liability for those in violation of Subchapter
A of Chapter 349 of the Texas Finance Code).
73. FIN. §§ 305.001–.002, 349.001–.002.
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extended.”74  In order for a plaintiff to recover, he or she has to be an
immediate party to the loan transaction.75  The plaintiff’s status as an ob-
ligor, for the purpose of establishing standing, is a question of law for the
court to determine.76
After establishing that the plaintiff is an obligor, it must next be shown
that there was an actual loan of money from the defendant to the plain-
tiff.  A loan is considered to be “an advance of money that is made to or
on behalf of an obligor,” with the principal amount owed by the obligor
to the creditor.77  Much like determining if the plaintiff is an obligor, the
question of whether the transaction is a loan will be a question for the
court, determined by the circumstances and the intentions of the
parties.78
ii. Plaintiff has an Obligation to Pay Back the Loan
The second hurdle required to bring a successful usury action is that
the plaintiff must prove that there was an absolute obligation for the loan
to be repaid.79  Furthermore, the understanding that the principal is abso-
lutely repayable must exist between the parties.80  An exception to the
loan being an absolute obligation is when the promise to pay the loan is
contingent, and it remains unclear if the borrower would pay a usurious
74. FIN. § 301.002(a)(13).  The definition of an obligor “does not include: (A) a judg-
ment debtor; or (B) a surety, guarantor, or similar person.” Id.  A judgment debtor is
defined as “a person obligated to pay a money judgment.” Id. at § 301.002(a)(6).
75. Allee v. Benser, 779 S.W.2d 61, 62 (Tex. 1988).  The general rule in a usury cause
of action is that the “usury cause of action is personal to the obligor.” Id.  In this case, the
petitioners, argued that a junior lien holder is an exception to this rule, but the Texas
Supreme Court ruled that only immediate parties to the transaction may bring a usury
cause of action, dismissing petitioners argument. Id.
76. El Paso Ref., Inc. v. Scurlock Permian Corp., 77 S.W.3d 374, 383 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2002, pet. denied).  The question of standing is a question of law to be decided by the
court, not the jury. Id.  The trial court below erred in permitting the jury to answer a
question of law, however such a jury instruction that included a question regarding a
party’s status as an obligor was not harmful error. Id.
77. FIN. § 301.002(a)(10).  This definition does not include judgments. Id.
78. Bray v. McNeely, 682 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no
writ).  In this case the contract was for the purchase of an interest in property. Id.  There
was a letter between the parties that was held to be “probative evidence of the sale of an
interest in property.” Id. at 618.  Thus, the transaction was not considered a loan but
rather an interest in property. Id. at 620.
79. Anglo-Dutch Petroleum Int’l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 96 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
80. Korth v. Tumlinson, 73 S.W.2d 1048, 1049 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1934, no
writ).  Here, there was no language in the contract that required the principal to be paid
absolutely, as the contract failed to state that Mrs. Tumlinson “was to repay Korth the
amount of money advanced by him.” Id.
504 THE SCHOLAR [Vol. 14:489
amount—here, the loan is not considered an absolute obligation.81  Even
so, if the contingency interest amount is mentioned in the contract, the
loan is usurious when, should the contingency occur, the borrower is obli-
gated to pay that usurious amount.82
iii. Defendant Contracted for, Charged, or Received Interest That
Exceeded the Maximum Amount Allowed by Law
Finally, under the Texas Finance Code, the plaintiff must prove that the
interest charged exceeds the maximum rate under the law and is there-
fore usurious.83  As noted previously, the OCCC determines the maxi-
mum interest rate, which as of September 13, 2011, is eighteen percent.84
In order to understand this critical element, interest must be defined.  As
defined by the Texas Finance Code, interest is the compensation allowed
by law “for the use, forbearance, or detention of money.”85  Any addi-
tional fees, which are supported by consideration that is in addition, sepa-
rate, and not the lending of money, is not considered interest and thus
does not violate usury law.86  The label given to a charge, on its face, is
not the critical part that courts look to when considering if the charge will
qualify as interest, the courts have to look beyond the label—this is cru-
81. See Anglo-Dutch Petroleum, 193 S.W.3d at 96–97 (holding that, per the agree-
ments between the parties, there was no obligation from Anglo-Dutch to repay the invest-
ments made, which in turn renders the agreements non-usurious).
82. See Dixon v. Brooks, 678 S.W.2d 728, 729 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984,
writ ref’d n.r.e.) (denying appellants’ argument that the contingent late charge of ten per-
cent in the contract was considered to be usurious).  Accordingly, the court held that:
The appropriate calculation is to combine the interest paid and the late charge that
could have been collected and to apply that total to the entire principal balance due
from the accrual date to the date of payment; since that total does not exceed ten
percent per annum, the contract is not usurious.
Id. at 731.
83. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 301.002(a)(17) (West 2006).
84. Office of Consumer Credit Comm’r, supra note 66.
85. FIN. § 301.002(a)(4).  The statute reads further:
The term does not include time price differential, regardless of how it is denominated.
The term does not include compensation or other amounts that are determined or
stated by this code or other applicable law not to constitute interest or that are permit-
ted to be contracted for, charged, or received in addition to interest in connection with
an extension of credit.
Id.
86. First Bank v. Tony’s Tortilla Factory, Inc., 877 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Tex. 1994).  The
insufficient fund fees at issue in this case were each a “separate and additional considera-
tion for processing each bad check,” and were thus not considered to be interest. Id. at
288.
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cial because sometimes when a charge is initially not labeled as interest, it
invariably ends up as such.87
Although Texas usury law appears to protect borrowers against usuri-
ous interest rates, the usury laws in Texas are rendered useless by the
practice of FDIC-regulated state banks partnering with payday lenders.
Through a combination of agencies and statutes, borrowers in Texas are
afforded little protection against out-of-state interest rates charged by
payday lenders.
III. THE PROBLEM OF STATE CHARTER RENTING
A. The Laws in Texas That Govern Interest Rates for Payday Lenders
i. Texas Usury Law
As previously mentioned, Subtitle B of the Texas Finance Code covers
usury actions for payday loans.88  The crux of the problem under Texas
usury law is exceeding the interest rate cap, as payday lenders are able to
charge more than the legal interest rate in Texas.
ii. Interest Rate Caps
The Office of Consumer Credit Commissioner (OCCC) authorizes in-
terest rates for payday loans in Texas to be no more than eighteen per-
cent.89  If a payday lender attempts to charge more than this, then a cause
of action for usury will lie because the Texas Finance Code is clear in
determining that any interest exceeding the cap is usurious.90  In addition,
the duration of the payday loan is also subject to regulation.91
87. Gonzales Cnty. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Freeman, 534 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Tex. 1976).
The court reasoned that “[s]uch a rule is to be fairly applied to both borrowers and lenders
alike,” and that “[l]abels put on particular charges are not controlling.” Id.  However, if
the fee “commits the lender to make a loan at some future date,” then the fee does not fall
under the aforementioned definition, and in this scenario “the lender may charge extra for
this consideration without violating the usury laws.” Id.
88. See supra, Part II.C; TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. §§ 342.251–59 (West 2006) (listing sev-
eral areas under subchapter F of subtitle B, which governs usury causes of action for pay-
day loans).
89. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 342.201 (West 2006); Office of Consumer Credit Comm’r,
supra note 66.
90. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN.  FIN. § 301.002(a)(17) (West 2006).
91. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 342.508 (West 2006).  Under this statute:
A lender may not enter a loan contract under Section 342.201(a) or Section 342.201(e)
under which the borrower agrees to make a scheduled payment of principal more
than: (1) [thirty-seven] calendar months after the date on which the contract is made,
if the contract is for a cash advance of $1,500 or less; (2) [forty-nine] calendar months
after the date on which the contract is made, if the contract is for a cash advance of
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iii. Other Remedies
Assuming that an aggrieved borrower meets all of the elements to
bring a successful cause of action for usury, the borrower has several rem-
edies available.  One must realize that since the usury laws are penal in
nature, only those penalties explicitly set out in the governing statutes are
recoverable.92  In addition, the remedies available turn upon what subti-
tle of the Texas Finance Code is applicable to the transaction—since Sub-
title B applies to payday loans, we turn our attention there.
If a defendant in a usury cause of action is determined to have charged
interest greater than the amount authorized by Subtitle B, he will be lia-
ble for twice the amount of interest charged.93  Furthermore, if a defen-
dant is found to have charged more than twice the limit under Subtitle B,
he will additionally be liable for the entire principal or principal balance
plus all the interest.94  A charge of a criminal misdemeanor (not exceed-
ing $100) is also possible when a defendant charges more than twice the
allowed amount of interest.95
As a limit to recovery, a borrower may only obtain one form of recov-
ery for multiple violations occurring in the same transaction, although it
may be possible for a plaintiff to recover more than once as borrowers
may engage in more than one “transaction” when they roll-over their
loans.96
Another consideration in filing a usury action is the statute of limita-
tions, which is again dependent on which subtitle of the Texas Finance
more than $1,500 but not more than $3,000; or (3) [sixty] months after the date on
which the contract is made, if the contract is for a cash advance of more than $3,000.
Id.
92. See, e.g., Steves Sash & Door Co. v. Ceco Corp., 751 S.W.2d 473, 476 (Tex. 1988)
(requiring that the statutes governing usury are to be strictly construed since they are penal
in nature); Domizio v. Progressive Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 54 S.W.3d 867, 872 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2001, pet. denied) (requiring that usury statutes be strictly construed).
93. TEX. FIN. CODE. ANN. § 349.001(a)(1) (West 2006).
94. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 349.002 (West 2006).
95. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 349.501 (West 2006).  In full, this statute reads:
(a) A person commits an offense if the person contracts for, charges, or receives inter-
est, time price differential, and other charges that in an aggregate amount exceed
twice the total amount of interest, time price differential, and other charges authorized
by this subtitle.  (b) An offense under this section is a misdemeanor punishable by a
fine of not more than $100.  (c) Each contract or transaction that violates Subsection
(a) is a separate offense.
Id.
96. See Bray v. McNeely, 682 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984,
no writ) (explaining that a court looks to the surrounding circumstances to consider
whether the transaction is a loan).  Thus, if a court determined that a consumer’s refinance
or rollover of their debt is a transaction, then multiple remedies for usury may lie.
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Code governs.  Usury actions under Subtitle B must be brought before
the later occurrence of either (1) four years after the loan in which the
violation occurred, or (2) two years after the violation occurred.97
Of course, there are defenses that a defendant in Texas can assert to
avoid liability from a usury cause of action, one of which is particularly
relevant here.  In a Texas usury cause of action a defendant can claim
federal preemption to avoid liability, as is the case with state-chartered
banks that are federally insured.98  However, this is only one part of the
problem in Texas, as payday lenders can also sidestep Texas law by
partnering with out-of-state banks, which is discussed in Part III.C.
B. How State-Chartered Banks Avoid Texas Laws and Export Interest
Rates into Texas
There is clearly a problem when interest rates on loans from payday
lenders are typically anywhere from 450% to 880% APR (annual per-
centage rate) for a two-week loan of $200.99  It should come as no sur-
prise then that Texas payday lenders reap huge profits by preying on
borrower desperation, which can stem from financial emergencies, a re-
duction in wages, and having no alternative credit option, although this is
not an exhaustive list.100
i. Most Favored Lender Doctrine
In order to understand how banks located in another state are able to
export interest rates into Texas, an examination of the “most favored
lender doctrine” (MFLD) is necessary.101  The MFLD was first articu-
97. FIN. § 349.402(a).  As for actions regarding open-end credit transactions, there is a
two-year limitation after the date of the violation in order to bring an action. Id.
98. See FDIC Advisory Op., FDIC-93-27 (July 12, 1993), available at http://
www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/4000-8160.html#fdic400093-27 (stating that usury and
other state common law claims against federally insured state-chartered banks are pre-
empted by the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980).
99. FOX, supra note 47, at 13.  The APR rate comes from a survey in Texas conducted
by the Consumers Union’s Austin office in 2003. Id.  This survey “found that none of the
[payday lenders] came close to the 178.98% APR cap for a two-week $200 loan.” Id.
100. Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1, 103 (2002).  While the author recognizes that “although the image of the
typical payday loan customer remains incomplete,” it is not hard to imagine that payday
loans are seemingly one of the few remaining options available to those in need of money.
Id.  See Emily Jeffcott, Comment, The Mortgage Reform and Anti Predatory Act of 2007:
Paving a Secure Path for Minorities in the Midst of the Subprime Debacle, 10 SCHOLAR 449,
470 (2008) (indicating that “[a]lthough there has been demonstrated success in state anti-
predatory lending legislation, federal preemption statutes now limit their effectiveness”).
101. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (2006) (applying the MFLD to state-chartered banks).
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lated in Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri,102 where the Court recog-
nized that national banks need the ability to compete with state banks.103
The MFLD is codified in 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a), and the initial purpose
behind it was to prevent any discrimination against nationally chartered
banks from the state in which they are headquartered.104  National banks
were allowed to charge interest on loans that complied with the usury
laws in the state they were located.105  The MFLD was later extended
under the exportation doctrine (ED) to include state-chartered banks.106
ii. Exportation Doctrine
The exportation doctrine incorporated the most favored lender doc-
trine in a way that forms the crux of the problems associated with payday
loans; this is seen in the case of Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis
v. First Omaha Service Corp.,107 where Justice Brennan held that a na-
tional bank headquartered in one state may use that state’s interest rates
when charging customers located in another state, even if the rate
charged is higher than the rate allowed where the customer resides.108  In
plain language, national and state banks are allowed to have most fa-
vored lender status, and thus are allowed to export interest rates into
other states, even if the interest rate cap in the receiving state is lower.109
However, one important limitation to the MFLD is that the doctrine only
applies to banks under the purview of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act.110
If a federally insured state-chartered bank is considered to be a most
favored lender, they are then permitted to charge interest at the greater
rate of either (1) one percent above the discount rate on ninety-day com-
mercial paper in effect at the Federal Reserve bank in the district where
the bank is located, or (2) the rate allowed by the laws of the state where
102. 85 U.S. 409 (1873).
103. Tiffany v. Nat’l Bank of Mo., 85 U.S. 409, 412–13 (1873) (explaining that Con-
gress intended to give national banks a way in which they can operate in light of competing
state banks and any adverse state law).  Justice Strong reasoned that it would be unfair to
national banks “to expose them to the hazard of unfriendly legislation by the States, or to
ruinous competition with State banks.” Id. at 413.
104. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (2006).
105. Id.
106. See Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S.
299, 308 (1978) (giving national banks the ability to take MFL status across state lines and
sidestep the borrower’s home state laws via the exportation doctrine).
107. 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
108. Marquette Nat’l Bank, 439 U.S. at 301.
109. Id. at 308.
110. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(a)(2) (2006) (setting forth the scope of the MFLD, where the
state bank must be receiving deposits).
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the bank is located.111  This latter point for most favored lender banks is
what allows the exportation of interest rates.
C. “Rent-a-Charter” Arrangements Between Payday Lenders and
FDIC-Regulated State-Chartered Banks
Payday lenders, in order to avoid Texas’s and other states’ usury laws,
partner with state-chartered banks via “rent-a-charter” or charter renting
arrangements; this allows the payday lender to make loans for the bank in
the borrower’s home state, and afterwards they buy the loan from the
bank and subsequently claim that the borrower’s home state usury laws
are inapplicable.112  Simply put, the out-of-state bank makes the loan,
and it is quickly purchased by the payday lender; this business relation-
ship allows the payday lender and the out-of-state bank to share the prof-
its from the loan.113
The problem in Texas is compounded by the fact that payday lenders
partner with state-chartered banks that are headquartered in a state that
is either minimally regulated  or not regulated at all; therefore, there is no
cap on the interest rates that are exported to Texas.114  A quick distinc-
tion between the three levels of regulation regarding payday loans that
exist in the United States is necessary to understand the problem.
The three levels of state regulation regarding payday loans are (1) al-
low but regulate, (2) prohibit them, or (3) no regulation at all.115  Texas is
a member of the first category—allow but regulate.  As previously dis-
cussed in Part II, Texas law provides protection for its residents against
predatory lending, yet the advent of payday lenders partnering with out-
of-state banks renders Texas law ineffective in this area.
111. § 1831d(a).
112. Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doc-
trine and Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518, 582–83 (2004).
A reason for why payday lenders and banks enter into such business relationships is that
payday lenders benefit from the exportation doctrine applicable to banks; one such exam-
ple is seen between Goleta National Bank and ACE Cash Express: “ACE purchased a
[ninety percent] participation in each loan made by the bank, bore [ninety percent] of the
loss on any loan that defaulted, received the loan payments, paid collection costs, and kept
the loan records.” Id. at 583.
113. Mendenhall, supra note 23, at 321.  Due to this process, the lender is immune to
any state usury causes of action, and can “charge any rate permitted by the laws of the
state where the out-of-state bank is located.” Id.
114. § 1831d(a); Reynolds, supra note 49, at 334.
115. Reynolds, supra note 40, at 337–39.
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There is criticism of all three methods of regulation, and it appears that
only Congress has the ability to halt the “rent-a-charter” methods em-
ployed by payday lenders.116
D. The FDIC’s Regulation of Out-of-State Banks: Is it Enough?
Since FDIC-regulated state-chartered banks are a primary focus of this
Comment, an analysis of the breadth of FDIC’s regulatory scope as it
pertains to such banks is warranted.  The FDIC is a corporation, which
essentially allows it to sue as well as be sued.117  It is governed by a board
of directors that consists of five members: (1) the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, (2) the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, and (3) three
U.S. citizens, with one of these citizens having experience in state bank
supervision.118
The FDIC has the power to examine FDIC-regulated state-chartered
banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System.119  Thus, the
banks that partner with payday lenders fall under the scope of the FDIC.
In addition, the FDIC can examine its insured banks for insurance pur-
poses.120  Most importantly, the FDIC is capable of removing a bank’s
insured status if they are found to have engaged in unsafe and unsound
banking practices.121  The discretion for such a finding lies with the
116. Johnson, supra note 100, at 126.  The author believes that “Congress should
amend banking law to prevent banks from being a tool for payday lenders to ignore state
law and exploit consumers.” Id. at 127.  Quoting North Carolina Attorney General Roy
Cooper, the author furthers this point: “‘We don’t believe bank charters were created to
enable companies to circumvent laws that are designed to protect consumers.’” Id.
117. 12 U.S.C. § 1819(a) (2006).  The sue and be sued provision reads: “Fourth.  To
sue and be sued, and complain and defend, by and through its own attorneys, in any court
of law or equity, State or Federal.” Id.
118. 12 U.S.C. § 1812(a)(1) (2006).
119. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1814, 1820(a) (2006) (demonstrating that all insured banks are
subject to the reach of FDIC, and that it may utilize the resources of other Federal agen-
cies to examine any such bank).
120. § 1820(b).  This section provides for the examination procedures for any insured
depository institution’s insured status:
In addition to the examinations authorized under paragraph (2), any examiner ap-
pointed under paragraph (1) shall have power, on behalf of the Corporation, to make
any special examination of any insured depository institution whenever the Board of
Directors determines a special examination of any such depository institution is neces-
sary to determine the condition of such depository institution for insurance purposes.
Id.
121. 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (2006).  This applies to any insured depository institution that is
not “(A) a national member bank; (B) a State member bank; (C) a Federal branch; (D) a
Federal savings association; or (E) an insured branch which is required to be insured under
subsection (a) or (b) of section 3104 of this title . . . .” Id.  If the Board of Directors
determines that an insured depository institution has engaged in unsafe or unsound bank-
ing practices, the Board must notify the appropriate agency “not less than [thrity] days
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FDIC.122  “Unsafe and unsound banking practices” have been defined by
some courts as those practices that involve “conduct deemed contrary to
accepted standards of banking operations,” and if allowed to persist,
would significantly damage the bank, shareholders, or other agencies that
disperse insurance funds.123  There are, however, other grounds in which
the FDIC may terminate a bank’s insured status.  One such additional
ground for insured status termination is if the bank violated any law or
order from the FDIC,124 but such termination is generally imposed only if
the FDIC also finds that the bank itself is engaging in “unsafe and un-
sound banking practices.”125
Even with these guidelines the FDIC has continued to insure banks
that are from states with no usury cap and participate in charter rentals;
some examples include Reliabank Dakota, American Bank & Trust, and
Bryant State Bank—all based in the state of South Dakota, which has no
usury cap.126  Another problem with the FDIC is its willingness to permit
a state-chartered bank to switch regulators; this was the case with First
Bank of Delaware which was a Federal Reserve member bank.127  Fur-
thermore, while it is true that the FDIC issues guidelines, they do not
replace state regulation of lenders, and they are not applied in a timely
fashion.128
before the notice required by subparagraph (B),” unless this period is waived by the
agency. Id.  An insured depository institution subject to the possibility of having its in-
sured status revoked still has the right to an administrative hearing. Id.
122. See FDIC v. Bank of Coushatta, 930 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1991) (mentioning
that the FDIC has discretion in determining whether the failure to maintain capital rose to
the level of being an unsafe or unsound banking practice).
123. Oberstar v. FDIC, 987 F.2d 494, 502 (8th Cir. 1993).  The FDIC failed to prove
that Oberstar’s conduct rose to the level of being an unsafe and unsound banking practice,
as the conduct in question was “attending the August 6 shareholders’ meeting and voting
the Kronholm shares to reelect incumbent directors.” Id.  Oberstar previously attempted
to buy Kronholm’s eighty-four percent interest in the failing bank, Boundary Waters State
Bank of Ely, Minnesota, so that something could be done about the bank’s situation. Id. at
498.  The FDIC denied such an agreement, claiming that Oberstar “lacks the competence
and integrity to have a controlling voice in a troubled bank.” Id.
124. § 1818(a)(2).
125. Oberstar, 987 F.2d at 502.
126. FOX, supra note 47, at 20.
127. Id.  First Bank of Delaware, a Delaware State chartered bank, was a member of
the Federal Reserve until 2003 when it told the S.E.C., that it would like to terminiate its
payday lending business. Id. Rather than terminate the lucrative business The FDIC sug-
gested they merely reliquish their membership in the Federal Reserve. Id. With the FDIC
allowing First Bank of Delaware to be subject to its regulatory authority, it appears that
the FDIC “is willing to accept banking practices that the Federal Reserve Bank of Phila-
delphia likely rejected.” Id. at 21.
128. Id. at 22, 24.  The FDIC guidelines do not set limits for payday loans, but instead
consider several other aspects of lending programs, including: treating loans for longer
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From the foregoing, it appears that the FDIC lacks the will to effec-
tively deal with the problem of payday lenders and FDIC-regulated state-
chartered banks.
IV. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
At first glance, it appears that Texas law has little or no effect when it
comes to the regulation of payday lenders.  However, there are several
possible solutions.  First, the FDIC should take further action, beyond
mere warnings, against the banks they regulate.  Second, to replace the
predatory loan scheme certain programs (with little modification) could
serve to provide an effective alternative loan mechanism to those who are
in need.  Lastly, instead of focusing on addressing usurious interest rates
in Texas, the state should enact legislation that bans the practice of pay-
day lending.
A. The FDIC Should Take Further Action to End Their Insured
Banks from Partnering with Payday Lenders
The FDIC, along with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(Comptroller), are the primary regulators of banks who rent their char-
ters.129  The Comptroller has denounced the practice of payday lenders
partnering with banks generally, yet they only regulate national banks.130
It is the FDIC along with various state-regulating authorities that oversee
state-chartered banks.131
The FDIC continues to allow state-chartered banks to enter into ar-
rangements with payday lenders as long as there are risk avoidance
guidelines in place to protect borrowers.132  These risk avoidance guide-
lines should be strengthened to specifically include a review of an insured
bank’s policies when it comes to partnering with payday lenders; in other
than sixty days as a loss, identifying the limits on rollovers and refinancing, inquiring as to a
borrower’s ability to repay if requested, and whether there are any waiting periods for
additional loans. Id. at 22–23.  However, these guidelines appear to “fall far short of the
state laws or regulations evaded by payday lender-bank partnerships.” Id. at 23.  On top of
that, “[t]he FDIC [has] also failed to provide guidance to regional offices that have to
interpret the guidelines.” Id. at 24.
129. 2 KENNETH M. LAPINE ET AL., BANKING LAW § 30.03[2][a], at 30–12 to –13 (Mat-
thew Bender 2011).
130. Id.  While it is true that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has effec-
tively eliminated “rent-a-bank schemes involving national banks,” FDIC-insured institu-
tions “continue arrangements with payday lenders that allow payday lenders to avoid state
usury laws.” Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at § 30–13.  Thus, although payday lenders are prohibited from dealing with
national banks, they “may still enter into arrangements with out-of-state state banks be-
cause of the differences between FDIC and OCC policies.” Id.
2011] PAYDAY LOANS 513
words, the FDIC should review a “bank’s risk assessment and strategic
planning, as well as the bank’s due diligence process for selecting a com-
petent and qualified third party provider.”133  In addition, FDIC examin-
ers should consider several factors when reviewing the partnership
between FDIC-regulated banks and payday lenders; ideally, the partner-
ship should: list the “responsibilities of each party,” state that each party
will adhere to the regulatory laws, clarify which party (the bank or pay-
day lender) will disclose the relevant laws and regulations to the bor-
rower, permit the bank to oversee the payday lender’s activities which
includes being able to review all of the transaction records, provide for
indemnity against the bank from the payday lender from its activities, and
adequately address any complaints from the borrower.134
In a March 1, 2005 letter by Michael J. Zamorski, the Director of the
Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection Department of the
FDIC, payday loans should not be “provided to customers who have had
payday loans outstanding from any lender for a total of three months in
the previous [twelve] months.”135  Furthermore, if a borrower does have
loans from other lenders that are in excess of three months within a pe-
riod of one year, then the “institutions should offer the customer, or refer
the customer to, an alternative longer-term credit product that more ap-
propriately suits the customer’s needs.”136  These recommendations by
the FDIC appear to have one central theme—more oversight that will
lead to fewer problems with payday lenders.
However, although more oversight by the FDIC may be a possible so-
lution to the problem of payday lending, it will not address one of the
central problems of payday loans in Texas—the ability of payday lenders
to avoid Texas law regarding usurious interest rates.  Instead of the FDIC
taking direct action against the banks they insure, they may have more
success in addressing the problem of payday lenders by providing small-
dollar loans or encouraging other organizations doing the same.
133. FDIC, FIL-14-2005, PAYDAY LENDING PROGRAMS: REVISED GUIDELINES FOR
PAYDAY LENDING (2005), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2005/
fil1405.html.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.  In the Financial Institution Letter Mr. Zamorski states that FDIC-regulated
institutions were instructed to produce written plans as to how they will incorporate the
FDIC’s recommendations, and he mentions the possibility of “using a mystery shopper
program in conjunction with its examination process of institutions involved in payday
lending.” Id.
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B. Alternative Loan Programs by the FDIC and ACCIO´N Texas
Louisiana
i. The FDIC Pilot Program
Although it is not a direct solution to the problem of payday lending,
the FDIC recently conducted a pilot of an alternative loan program,
which proved to be successful.137  The pilot program ran for two years—
from December 2007 through December 2009.138  The program was de-
signed to gauge the effectiveness and feasibility of small-dollar loans of-
fered by FDIC-insured banks.139  According to a 2007 press release by
the FDIC, another reason why the program was created was to build a
working relationship between a borrower and the bank; as a prerequisite
to obtaining a payday loan, a borrower needed a checking account, and
instead of borrowers going to payday lenders it was thought to be benefi-
cial for them to use their own bank for their small-loan needs.140
One important benefit for borrowers who used this program includes
giving borrowers a “meaningful opportunity to repay based on their cir-
cumstances.”141  Thus, the FDIC appears to be promulgating a program
that considers an individual borrower’s situation, with the added benefit
of furthering a business relationship.
Another benefit to using this program has to do with the very nature of
the relationship between a borrower and a lender; payday loans are typi-
cally more heavily advertised and available, but if instead a borrower can
use their own bank, then not only will they have the benefit of an existing
relationship with the bank, but the loan itself will come through faster
137. FDIC, FIL-31-2010, SMALL-DOLLAR LOAN PILOT RESULTS RELEASED: PILOT
STUDY RESULTS IN CREATION OF SAFE, AFFORDABLE AND FEASIBLE TEMPLATE FOR
SMALL-DOLLAR LOANS (2010), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2010/
fil10031.pdf [herinafter FIL-31-2010].  The actual program was “designed to illustrate the
feasibility of banks offering alternatives to high-cost credit products, such as payday loans
and fee-based overdraft programs.” Id.  It consisted of “loan amounts up to $2,500; annual
percentage rates of [thirty-six] percent or less; low or no fees; streamlined underwriting;
and loan terms of [ninety] days or more.” Id.
138. Rae-Ann Miller et al., A Template for Success: The FDIC’s Small-Dollar Loan
Pilot Program, 4 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. Q., no. 2, 2010 at 28, 37, available at http://www.
fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2010_vol4_2/FDIC_Quarterly_Vol4No2.pdf.  The results
proved that banks could offer effective alternatives to payday loans. Id.
139. Id.  The program appears to be successful, as “[a]lmost all of the pilot bankers
indicated . . . that they will continue their small-dollar programs beyond the pilot.” Id.
140. Press Release, FDIC, PR-52-2007 FDIC Issues Final Guidelines on Affordable
Small-Dollar Loans (June 19, 2007), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2007/
pr07052a.html.
141. Id.  Eventually, once a borrower has had a chance to strengthen their credit his-
tory, they may get “other more significant asset-building loans, such as home mortgage
loans and small business loans.” Id.
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due to the bank’s familiarity with the borrower—this is critical for a bor-
rower’s emergencies and other expenses.142  As an added layer of protec-
tion, the program recommended that FDIC-insured banks carefully
oversee a borrower’s loan, so that the bank can render appropriate finan-
cial advice; this ultimately “help[s] these borrowers become better cus-
tomers and improve long-term relationships.”143
Over the two-year pilot period, many of the participating banks re-
ported that the program allowed for the building and retaining of custom-
ers.144  The banks also indicated that a beneficial characteristic of the
program was the element of time given to repay the loan; this was vital as
“it gave consumers more time to recover from a financial emergency than
a single pay cycle for payday loans.”145
It remains to be seen whether the rest of the FDIC-insured banks that
did not participate in this pilot-program will begin providing alternative
loans.  Even if other FDIC-insured banks do not offer these kinds of
loans, there appear to be various non-bank alternatives to payday loans.
ii. ACCIO´N Texas-Louisiana
ACCIO´N Texas-Louisiana (ATL), is a non-profit organization that
seeks to provide entrepreneurs and small businesses with loans that are
not available to them via traditional banks.146  According to ATL’s 2009
Annual Report, ATL has made over 10,500 loans to over 7,000 clients to
date.147  ATL is prospering, and a very simple although lofty goal would
be to expand the scope of ATL’s loans to the kind that the FDIC sug-
gested via its pilot program.  In doing so, not only would borrowers have
another option in obtaining a loan, but it would also ensure that even if
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Miller et al., supra note 138.  As for how likely the program was to succeed, it
depended largely on “strong senior management and board of director support.” Id.  A
challenge to the success of the program depended on how well the alternative loan service
was promoted, especially when this service was one among so many. Id.
145. Id.
146. ACCIO´N TEXAS-LOUISIANA, http:/www.acciontexas.org (last visited Sept. 21,
2011).  The mission statement of ACCIO´N Texas-Louisiana reads: “The mission of AC-
CIO´N Texas-Louisiana is to provide credit and services to small businesses that do not
have access to loans from commercial sources and to provide leadership and services to the
micro lending field on a national level.” Id.
147. ACCIO´N TEXAS-LOUISIANA, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2010), available at http://
www.acciontexas.org/download/ACCION%202009%20Annual%20Report%20Web.pdf.
[hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT]  According to ACCIO´N Texas-Louisiana’s 2009 Annual
Report the organization manages a portfolio of approximately $25.82 million, and during
2009 made 958 loans for a total of $15.87 million, serving 611 new clients. Id.  In addition,
they expanded into Louisiana for the first time in 2009, making twenty-five new loans for
$273,145 to start with. Id.
516 THE SCHOLAR [Vol. 14:489
an FDIC-insured bank did not provide alternative small dollar loans, a
borrower could look to ATL rather than resorting to a payday lender.
There is also the possibility that banks, instead of adopting the pilot
program suggested by the FDIC, can still contribute to the availability of
alternative loans.  In August of 2008, Citibank partnered with ATL in a
deal to purchase up to $30 million of ATL loans for a five-year term; in
just a year, ATL loaned $6 million to borrowers under this deal with
Citibank.148
While ATL could possibly expand their operations to include alterna-
tive loans that would hopefully replace the need for payday lending ser-
vices, the biggest drawback is readily apparent: lack of funds.  ATL
operates on the basis of grants; upon receiving a borrower’s payment on
the loan, the money is then redistributed to other prospective borrow-
ers.149  Although various organizations like the Meadows Foundation, the
Economic Development Administration, and the North American Devel-
opment Bank have donated funds,150 it isn’t clear if ATL will be able to
also include alternative small-dollar loans in its scope of services to
borrowers.
Ultimately, if the FDIC’s pilot-program is not widely adopted, or if
ATL is unable to implement a loan program that focuses on the personal
needs of borrowers other than for small businesses, there may have to be
action taken by the local legislature.  Although in Texas perhaps the best
solution is to eliminate payday lending altogether.
C. Banning Payday Loans in Texas
As previously discussed, Texas was listed as one of the states that toler-
ates but regulates payday loans and lenders.  However, the problem of
payday lenders circumventing Texas law still persists, due to the allow-
ance of the importation of usurious rates from out-of-state banks.  In-
stead of focusing on the usurious rates themselves and trying to reach a
compromise between the payday lenders that prey on borrowers and the
laws that “tolerate but regulate,” Texas should follow Georgia’s example
and legislatively eliminate payday lending altogether.151
148. Our History, ACCIO´N TEXAS-LOUISIANA, http://www.acciontexas.org/our-his-
tory.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
149. Id. (discussing the start up funding received for ACCIO´N’s start up in San
Antonio).  “The team learned the value of building personal relationships with borrowers
to ensure loan payback.” Id.
150. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 147.
151. Reynolds, supra note 40, at 339.  In order to prevent lenders from evading Texas
usury law, “an effective solution to restore authority to Texas regulation and the OCCC is
to prohibit the out-of-state exportation of interest rates into Texas.” Id.
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Georgia’s passing of Senate Bill 157 in May 2004 delivered several criti-
cal blows to payday lenders: (1) out-of-state banks were prohibited from
exporting usurious rates into Georgia, (2) the out-of-state banks were
subjected to racketeering laws should they continue to export usurious
interest rates, and (3) payday lenders could be subjected to class-action
lawsuits.152  This bill was passed in response to payday lenders “preying
on economically unsophisticated soldiers around Georgia bases.”153  The
interim report from Texas also recognizes the problem of the increasing
debt of military personnel in Texas, where roughly “ten percent of active
duty soldiers . . . needed financial counseling because of debt incurred by
payday and other short-term lending schemes.”154
Due to the payday-lending problem in Texas, the interim report specifi-
cally mentions the Texas Office of Consumer Credit Commissioner and
asserts that this agency cannot meet its goals of regulating payday lenders
effectively—the only solution then is to ban them completely.155
V. CONCLUSION
By adopting the two-pronged approach of providing a sufficient alter-
native to payday loans and eliminating payday lending in Texas, the prob-
lem of payday lending in Texas can be avoided.  In doing so, not only can
the problem be prevented, but there can also be another solution for
those who are left without an alternative for obtaining money.  Through
the adoption of alternative loan programs, such as those piloted by the
FDIC, borrowers can meet their immediate need for money without be-
ing trapped in a cycle of debt.156  Additionally, by prohibiting payday
loans in Texas, borrowers will no longer be taken advantage of by payday
lenders.
This is especially relevant today, with unemployment in the United
States reaching approximately 9.1% in August of 2011, it means that
152. S. COMM. ON VETERAN AFFAIRS & MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, INTERIM REP. TO
TEX. LT. GOVERNOR DAVID DEWHURST 78th Leg., at 23 (2004), available at http://
www.senate.state.tx.us/75r/senate/commit/c650/downloads/2004VAMI.pdf.  In addition,
payday lenders in Georgia are prohibited from garnishing wages from military members,
attempting to collect against deployed military members, and contacting the commanding
officer of a military member. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. The report discusses the negative impact on currently deployed reservists,
“many of whom receive less pay than they did in civilian life.” Id.
155. Id. Some of the recommendations by the Texas Senate Committee on Veteran
Affairs and Military Installations include requiring counseling prior to a loan being made
or before a renewal is given and limiting loan terms to a minimum of fourteen days. Id.
156. See generally FIL-31-2010, supra note 137 (detailing the pilot program for alter-
native loans under the FDIC).
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some 14 million unemployed individuals are struggling.157  The problem
of payday lending is not a marginal issue, as there is a clear need for
providing people facing a dire economic situation, like Mr. Leyva, with a
less arduous path to economic survival.158
However, due to the greed and indifference of payday lenders, many
like Mr. Leyva are forced into financial situations where instead of paying
back a loan within a short period of time, the borrower is trapped in a
cycle of debt.  Mr. Leyva was faced with a situation in which he was doing
everything he could to stay afloat; he worked two jobs, took care of his ill
mother, and was still unable to pay off his payday loan until seven months
later—at a cost of well over $500 in interest and fees, in addition to the
original loan amount of $225.159
The situation Mr. Leyva faced is not uncommon, for the sheer rate of
payday lending that occurs suggests that many borrowers may very well
be in a situation where money is needed, but more traditional loans could
not be obtained.160  However, it may be argued that the decision to get a
payday loan is one that the borrower should live with, as it is their deci-
sion.  This is a mistaken belief, for it is not a decision on the part of the
borrower.  It is, instead, a necessity if there is no alternative to begin with.
Mr. Leyva did not have a choice, so why then should he, or anyone for
that matter, have an additional, prolonged burden of exorbitantly en-
hanced debt?
Furthermore, the rhetoric from the government of enduring the state
of the economy161 means little to the substantial number of individuals
who must take out loans in order to survive.  As with Mr. Leyva, a rea-
sonable response to economic hardship is to take out a short-term loan
under the belief that conditions will improve, thus allowing the loan to be
157. News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep’t of Labor, The Employment Sit-
uation–August 2011 (Sept. 2, 2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/
empsit.pdf.
158. See Interview, supra note 2 (detailing the hardships that Mr. Leyva was facing at
the time he obtained a payday loan).
159. Id.  Mr. Leyva at one point was forced to sell some of his family’s personal prop-
erty just to ensure that he could make the payments on the payday loan. Id.
160. See Reynolds, supra note 40, at 322 (estimating that payday lenders extend “$40
billion in more than 22,000 payday advance locations”).
161. See generally President Barack Obama, Remarks of the President in the State of
the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
remarks-president-state-union-address (identifying that the United States is facing many
challenges that impact the economy, including unemployment, education, housing, and
healthcare).
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paid back.  However, that has not been the case, as the economy is still
recovering.162
In addition, the payday loans that are available are fueled by greed and
rank opportunism, when in a compassionate society they should be fueled
at least in part by a desire to actually help individuals recover, especially
in light of the currently sputtering economy.  There is no such desire from
payday lenders, but thankfully the problem is being recognized by the
government; President Barack Obama, in the 2010 State of the Union
Address, remarked that “[w]e need to make sure consumers and middle-
class families have the information they need to make financial
decisions.”163
By working closely with borrowers while keeping in mind a goal of
recovery and not of excessive profit, such a goal is possible, both for the
individual and the economy.  This is seen in the efforts of ACCIO´N
Texas-Louisiana as they provide a framework that can and should be uti-
lized for individuals in need of a loan.164  ATL already provides small
business loans for individuals who cannot otherwise obtain more tradi-
tional loans,165 thus it would not be unfathomable for ATL or another
similar entity to work with individuals to meet their immediate financial
needs.
Besides using ATL’s model of recovery and the FDIC’s pilot program
for alternative loans, there is movement in the right direction in address-
ing the payday-lending problem; in Texas, “[t]he National Credit Union
Administration recently adopted a new rule allowing federal credit un-
ions to make short-term, small-amount loans designed to provide con-
sumers with an alternative to borrowing from payday lenders.”166  These
loans are characterized by an interest rate maximum of twenty-eight per-
cent (a rate maximum in line with the maximum rates of many widely
used credit cards), a loan amount from $200 to $1000 lasting one to six
months, and a limit on the amount of loans and loan rollovers to an indi-
vidual during a six-month period.167  It remains to be seen what effect this
162. See id. (addressing the concerns of United States citizens, President Obama be-
gins the state of the union by focusing on the economy).  President Obama recognizes that
“[o]ne in [ten] Americans still cannot find work.  Many businesses have shuttered.  Home
values have declined.” Id.  The President goes on to comment on the state of the workers
in America: “People are out of work.  They’re hurting.  They need our help.” Id.
163. Id.
164. ACCIO´N TEXAS-LOUISIANA, supra note 146.
165. Id.
166. Rob Robertson, Regulators Approve Payday Loan Alternative, FORT WORTH
BUS. PRESS, Oct. 13, 2010, Banking and Finance (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary’s Law
Review on Minority Issues).
167. Id.
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particular alternative loan has, both for borrowers and in being a reliable
alternative to payday loans.
The problem of payday lending must not be ignored.  While the previ-
ously mentioned two-pronged approach may be effective, the only way
the true culprit, greed, may be fought is if it is countered with a sincere
desire to help individuals overcome their financial difficulties.
